Free your sensitive files software for windows

Deleting a file with Windows or with other programs will leave the file contents on your hard disk, easy to be recovered by anyone that has access to your computer. East-Tec File Shredder securely destroys (shreds) sensitive and private files beyond recovery. Simply drag and drop files to the shredder icon on your desktop, or select the files you want to destroy directly from the Windows Explorer right-click menu. Your sensitive files will be gone for good and nobody will be able to recover your valuable corporate trade secrets, business plans, personal files, photos or confidential letters. East-Tec File Shredder overwrites and verifies the destruction of every bit of the file, making recovery impossible.

Password protect programs you dont want users accessing. Encrypt your sensitive files with strong RC4 encryption. Plus lock Windows Boot and Windows Explorer.
With this free software you can password protect your programs, files and folders in one easy to use program. It lets you lock features of your system so that nobody can use them while you are away. The program lets you specify a password and then choose from a variety of options - what features to lock, for example, the find tool, backing up, desktop, etc. All the options are listed within one window and they are self-explaining. Whats more, there is also encryption for your personal files and folders. Plus there are extra features to lock the desktop, boot keys, task keys, software installations, internet access and more.
Note: This download is digitally signed for your safety and contains no adware or spyware.

CHAOS Shredder will completely erase files from your disk CHAOS Shredder is a useful software which deletes selected files and folders, freespace, recycled bin, temporary data, temporary internet files, cookie, history, last documents list. According to the wipe-level the files, freespace or internet traces up to 9 times.
Why do you need a CHAOS Shredder?
Windows does not physically remove deleted files from your hard disk. Emptying your Recycle Bin does NOT protect you at all.
Your sensitive files can be recovered, even after you format your hard disk! When you delete a file from Windows, Windows just mark the file as deleted in file allocation table, but the data of the file is still on your hard disk, there are many tools available which can let others easily recover your sensitive files even after you have formated the hard disk.
Sensitive data can easily fall into the wrong hands. And because Windows is not capable of deleting information beyond recovery, you are at risk!
Passwords, financial documents, even those "about last night" e-mails are fair game for the IT professionals, computer technicians or hackers. CHAOS Shredder allows you to purge, wipe and erase data with methods that far exceed US Department of Defense standards for file deletion (DOD 5220.22).
How does CHAOS Shredder protect your files?
By overwriting the portion on the hard drive that was previously allocated to the files several times with junk data, CHAOS Shredder will completely erase files from your disk, without the possibility to recover it by any practical software or hardware methods.

Have you ever created a Windows help file with context sensitive help? Forget any HelpContext and [MAP]-sections! TContextHelp does this job from now on: it links context sensitive help by controlnames. Drop it onto a form and go. Component and EXE-demo included.

Securely overwrite your sensitive files and cleanse your free space of previously deleted files One feature of Windows NT/2000s (Win2K) C2-compliance is that it implements object reuse protection. This means that when an application allocates file space or virtual memory it is unable to view data that was previously stored in the resources Windows NT/2K allocates for it. Windows NT zero-fills memory and zeroes the sectors on disk where a file is placed before it presents either type of resource to an application. However, object reuse does not dictate that the space that a file occupies before it is deleted be zeroed. This is because Windows NT/2K is designed with the assumption that the operating system controls access to system resources. However, when the operating system is not active it is possible to use raw disk editors and recovery tools to view and recover data that the operating system has deallocated. Even when you encrypt files with Win2Ks Encrypting File System (EFS), a files original unencrypted file data is left on the disk after a new encrypted version of the file is created.
The only way to ensure that deleted files, as well as files that you encrypt with EFS, are safe from recovery is to use a secure delete application. Secure delete applications overwrite a deleted files on-disk data using techiques that are shown to make disk data unrecoverable, even using recovery technology that can read patterns in magnetic media that reveal weakly deleted files. SDelete (Secure Delete) is such an application. You can use SDelete both to securely delete existing files, as well as to securely erase any file data that exists in the unallocated portions of a disk (including files that you have already deleted or encrypted). SDelete implements the Department of Defense clearing and sanitizing standard DOD 5220.22-M, to give you confidence that once deleted with SDelete, your file data is gone forever. SDelete is presented with full source code so that you can verify yourself that it works as advertized. Note that SDelete securely deletes file data, but not file names located in free disk space.
SDelete is a command line application which takes a number of options. In any given use, it helps you delete one or more files and/or directories, or to cleanse the free space on a logical disk. SDelete accepts wild card characters as part of the directory or file specifier.
Usage: sdelete [-p passes] [-s] [-q]
sdelete [-p passes] -z [drive letter]
-p passes
Specifies number of overwrite passes
-s
Recurse subdirectories
-q
Dont print errors (quiet)
-z
Cleanse free space
Securely deleting a file that has no special attributes is relatively straight-forward: the secure delete program simply overwrites the file with the secure delete pattern. What is more tricky is securely deleting Windows NT/2K compressed, encrypted and sparse files, and securely cleansing disk free spaces.
Compressed, encrypted and sparse are managed by NTFS in 16-cluster blocks. If a program writes to an existing portion of such a file NTFS allocates new space on the disk to store the new data and after the new data has been written, deallocates the clusters previously occupied by the file. NTFS takes this conservative approach for reasons related to data integrity, and in the case of compressed and sparse files, in case a new allocation is larger than what exists (the new compressed data is bigger than the old compressed data). Thus, overwriting such a file will not succeed in deleting the files contents from the disk.
To handle these types of files SDelete relies on the defragmentation API. Using the defragmentation API SDelete can determine precisely which clusters on a disk are occupied by data belonging to compressed, sparse and encrypted files. Once SDelete knows which clusters contain the files data, it can open the disk for raw access and overwrite those clusters.
Cleaning free space presents another challenge. Since FAT and NTFS provide no means for an application to directly address free space, SDelete has one of two options. The first is that it can, like it does for compressed, sparse and encrypted files, open the disk for raw access and overwrite the free space. This approach suffers from a big problem: even if SDelete were coded to be fully capable of calculating the free space portions of NTFS and FAT drives (something thats not trivial), it would run the risk of collision with active file operations taking place on the system. For example, say SDelete determines that a cluster is free, and just at that moment the file system driver (FAT, NTFS) decides to allocate the cluster for a file that another application is modifying. The file system driver writes the new data to the cluster, and then SDelete comes along and overwrites the freshly written data: the files new data is gone. The problem is even worse if the cluster is allocated for file system metadata since SDelete will corrupt the file systems on-disk structures.
The second approach, and the one SDelete takes, is to indirectly overwrite free space. First, SDelete allocates the largest file it can. SDelete does this using non-cached file I/O so that the contents of the NT file system cache will not be thrown out and replaced with useless data associated with SDeletes space-hogging file. Because non-cached file I/O must be sector (512-byte) aligned, there might be some left over space that isnt allocated for the SDelete file even when SDelete cannot further grow the file. To grab any remaining space SDelete next allocates the largest cached file it can. For both of these files SDelete performs a secure overwrite, ensuring that all the disk space that was previously free becomes securely cleansed.
On NTFS drives SDeletes job isnt necessarily through after it allocates and overwrites the two files. SDelete must also fill any existing free portions of the NTFS MFT (Master File Table) with files that fit within an MFT record. An MFT record is typically 1KB in size, and every file or directory on a disk requires at least one MFT record. Small files are stored entirely within their MFT record, while files that dont fit within a record are allocated clusters outside the MFT. All SDelete has to do to take care of the free MFT space is allocate the largest file it can - when the file occupies all the available space in an MFT Record NTFS will prevent the file from getting larger, since there are no free clusters left on the disk (they are being held by the two files SDelete previously allocated). SDelete then repeats the process. When SDelete can no longer even create a new file, it knows that all the previously free records in the MFT have been completely filled with securely overwritten files.
To overwrite file names of a file that you delete, SDelete renames the file 26 times, each time replacing each character of the files name with a successive alphabetic character. For instance, the first rename of "foo.txt" would be to "AAA.AAA".
The reason that SDelete does not securely delete file names when cleaning disk free space is that deleting them would require direct manipulation of directory structures. Directory structures can have free space containing deleted file names, but the free directory space is not available for allocation to other files. Hence, SDelete has no way of allocating this free space so that it can securely overwrite it.